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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

)

WESLEY G. HARLINE,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

]i

Case No. 92133-CA

vs.

]I

Category No. 16

RONALD C. BARKER and LARRY
WHYTE,

]
]

Defendants/Appellees. ]

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Plaintiff/Appellant claims jurisdiction pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 3, Constitution of Utah; Utah Code Annotated
78-2-2 (3) (j) and (4); 78-2a-3 (2) (Effective January 1, 1992; and
Rules 3 (a) and 4 (a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, in that
this appeal is from a final judgment of the Third Judicial District
Court of Salt Lake County, Utah.
A Notice of Appeal was timely filed.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Plaintiff/Appellant brought this action against his
former attorneys for malpractice arising out of their alleged
actions while his attorneys representing him in a pending
bankruptcy proceeding still pending in the United States Bankruptcy
(1)

Court of Utah.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Trial Court err in granting Defendants/

Appellees a summary judgment of no cause of action, pursuant to
a motion filed by them against the Plaintiff?
2.

Did the Trial Court err in entering a bench ruling,

not reduced to a formal order, that denied Plaintiff/Appellant's
motion to compel the Defendants/Appellees to reveal who their
witness would be in the event of a trial and answering other
interrogatories propounded by the Plaintiff/Appellant?
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue No. 1:
Summary Judgment is appropriate only when there
are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Larson v. Overland

Thrift & Loan, 818 P.2d 1316 (Utah App. 1991)
On review of a summary judgment the appellate court
must examine all the facts presented and the inferences drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to the loosing party.
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 178 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1992);
English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 688 (Utah App. 1989); Mountain
States Tele & Tel. Co v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah
1991); Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991).

(2)

The appellate court should affirm a judgment based
upon a summary judgment motion only where it appears there are
no genuine dispute of any material facts.

Reeves vs Geigy

Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah App. 1988); Hunt v. EEI
Engineering, Inc., 808 P.2d 1137 (Utah App. 1991).
The appellate court accords no deference to a trial
court's legal conclusions. Shurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc.,
814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). Frontier Foundations, Inc., vs. Layton
Construction Co., 171 Utah Adv Rep 25 (Utah App. 1991)
Issue No. 2:
The appellate court should construe the Rules of Civil
Procedure liberally.

State ex rel Road Commission v. Petty 17 Utah

2d 382, 412 P.2d 914 (1966).
The appellate court should construe the Rules of Civil
Procedure to simplify and make more efficient, pre-trial discovery
and eliminate "trial by ambush".

El lis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189,

429 P.2d 39 (1967).
RULES, STATUTES AND LAWS WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE
OF THE ISSUES SET OUT FOR REVIEW
Issue No. 1:
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(Set forth in the Addendum)
Issue No. 2:
Rule 26(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(Set forth in the Addendum)

(3)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff/Appellant
against the two Defendants/Appellees for alleged legal malpractice
of the two defendants who are practicing attorneys at law.
Defendants/Appellees filed a motion for Summary Judgment
and filed their memorandums of authorities with exhibits in support
thereof, which was responded to by the plaintiff who likewise filed
exhibits and affidavits and reply memorandums.
Plaintiff also filed a motion under Rule 37, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure to overrule certain objections filed by the
defendants to the answering of certain interrogatories, and for
an order to compel the defendants to answer the interrogatories.
The Court, in a bench ruling, not reduced to a formal
order, denied plaintiff's motion in its entirety.
The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Defendants/Appellees and against the Plaintiff/Appellant stating
that "there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the
defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
The present appeal followed in a timely manner and the
Supreme Court referred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals
as is provided by statute and rules.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

All depositions of the Plaintiff, (Dr. Harline

(4)

hereafter) and Defendants, (Mr. Barker and Mr. Whyte hereafter)
were before the Court and pertenant parts thereof were set forth in
the memorandums filed with the court as were various exhibits,
bankruptcy court transcripts and documents. References are made to
the various documents hereafter by citing page number of the
Record, but references are made to the Exhibits by letter number of
the original document due to questions of the pagination numbering
of some of the record.
2.

Mr. Barker and Mr. Whyte are both duly licensed

attorneys at law, who practice law in Salt Lake City, Utah.
R. 2, Complaint; R. 13, Answer.
3. Dr. Harline filed a voluntary petition in
Bankruptcy under Chapter 11, 11 USC 1, et.sea., on February 14,
1986, which was converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding in
September, 1988, and his discharge was denied.
R. 242, Exhibits "A" and "L".
4.

The Bankruptcy Court entered its Order directing

Dr. Harline and his attorneys to amend his bankruptcy schedules at
the time that it converted the proceedings to a Chapter 7
proceedings.
R. 242, Exhibit "L M ,
Affidavit, Cotro-Manes, Exhibit "C",
Court Order.

(5)

Entry No. 74; R. 75

R-6, Complaint, Attached

5.

Mr. Barker and Mr. Whyte did not amend any of Dr.

Harline's bankruptcy schedules. R. 242, Exhibit "L".
6.

Dr. Harline, had been represented by Mr. Pete

Vlahos, Esq., of Ogden, Utah, and then Mrs. Betty Marsh, Esq., of
Ogden as his attorneys prior to his retaining Mr. Barker and Mr.
Whyte.

R. 242, Exhibits "C", "D" and "E".
7.

Dr. Harline has a pending malpractice suit

which he filed against his first attorney Mr. Pete Vlahos, which
action was moved from the Second Judicial District Court to the
Third Judicial District Court.
8.

Mr.

Barker denied that he was retained to

represent Dr. Harline in his bankruptcy matter, Bankruptcy No. 8600623-JHA, but was retained solely to represent him in certain
Adversary Actions filed in the bankruptcy case against
Dr. Harline. R. 356 (Depo., Whyte p. 17).
9.

Dr. Harline claimed in his verified complaint,

deposition and affidavit in opposition to the Motion for summary
judgment that Mr. Barker did in fact represent him in his
bankruptcy proceeding. R. 2, verified complaint; R. 162, p. 2,
(Depo., Harline), also p. 119 thereof; R. 356, (Affidavit of
Harline, par 3 ) .
10.

Mr.

Barker throughout his entire deposition

denied that he was ever retained to represent Dr. Harline in his

(6)

b a n k r u p t c y ma t- t: ei

o i t a 11 ed and i el iiiierl 1.i

q i ' (•"> . I di r e c t

and

unequivocal a n s w e r :
Mr

Barker testified:

fl

Q. (Mr. C o t r o - M a n e s at line 1 6 ) : W e r e y o u retained
to g o into t h e v a r i o u s a s p e c t s of t h e personal
bankruptcy of D r . harline?
1!
]]

I don' t b e l i e v e s o .

^. ^ ^ u ,

v

D e p o, B a r k e r , p . 1 2 8 )

I: Ir . Barker represented to the United States

B a n k r u p t c y Court that he was representing D r . H a r l i n e in his
B a n k r u p t c y m a t t e r by h i s personal a p p e a r a n c e b e f o r e the United
States B a n k r u p t c y Court on N o v e m b e r 2 8 , 1986,

T h e official

transcript of the Court hearing on November 2 6 , 198 6 before the
h,

-

' o hn H

S 1 I e n , I J n i t e d S t a t e s B a n k r u p t c}

•

"

o

d e p o s . , of Barker and W h y t e ) in the matter of the withdrawal of M s .
M a r s h as attorney cf record for D r . H a r l i n e in his bankruptcy
m,atter, states c

-. c«<.• 3 :

"The C o u r t :

A r e there other a p p e a r a n c e s ?

Mr. Barker:

Ronald B a r k e r . "
R . 3 5 8 , (E x

1; I) • i;: > M a r s h , E x I , d e p o " s

of B a r k e r , W h y t e ) .

M it: s

M a r s 1 l i i i e x p 1 a i n i n g t h e r e a s o i i s f c :i : her

m o t i o n t-; w i t h d r a w , w h i c h h a d been filed on November 1 4 , 1 9 8 6 ,
stated to the Cour t:

(/;

(line 17, p. 3) "I'm asking the Court to allow
me to withdraw. Mr. Barker, who is present
here today, has already received the files
that were given to him, I believe by the
Vlahos & Sharp firm and he is already involved
in proceeding forward.
The Court then ruled from the bench:
"The COURT: Well, I think that counsel has stated,
counsel, old counsel--I don't want to say old counsel,
then former counsel.
Mrs. Marsh:

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Has stated proper grounds to withdraw and
new counsel has come in and I think it is appropriate.
I'm not going to put any limitations on the withdrawal
because of those reasons. I's sure Mr. Barker will
cooperate in moving things along and I'll require an
order authorizing withdrawal and then at this point I
assume Mr. Barker will file his appearance."
R. 358, (Ex., L to Def's Supp.,
Memo.,

pp. 3 and 5 ) .
13.

Mrs. Marsh testified:

Q. (Mr. Cotro-Manes) And in reading over the
transcript of the court appearance, (Exhibit 4)
apparently Mr. Barker had a few things to say.
Do you recall him actually saying those to the
Court?
A.

Yes, I do.

she previously testified:
Q. Did he--did anyone register any objection to
his appearance?
A.

Oh no.
R. 359,
(8)

(Depo., Marsh, p. 20).

I !r . Baikei

repiesenled I. o I lie United

States

B a n k r u p t c y Court by a sworn and verified petition for attorney's
fees that he commenced to represent Dr. H a r l i n e in his bankruptcy
m a t t e r < :>i : November 10, 1881.
W h y t e , R. 61

Ilk

,!

«VJ ( hx , II, D e p o ' s . , Barker and

(Affidavit, C o t r o - M a n e s , Ex. " A " ) .
No other attorney m a d e an,;,' sufaseqtiPi!1; appearance

15.

for Dr. H a r l i n e other than M r . B a r k e r , M r . W h y t e (Ex. N o .
35, D e p o . , W h y t e ) , R. 242, Ex. "I ,". and Mr. C o t r o - M a n e s , the
present attorney oi "
until July IP
16.

?opc
M"

"
;

>:

\ who cii i

^

;.,

:

p

Docket No. 176.

B a r k e r , his sworn d e p o s i t i o n to the
• • :• : . :: : \ .

contra

"L"

m a k e hi s a p p e a r a n c e

*

e under oat! :i :i n !: lis affidavit

that he commenced to represent Dr. H a r l i n e in his bankruptcy
i . December 31, 1 9 9 1 . R, 242,

Affidavit of Barker in support of

Motion f i Cdirintra,,y !,idgme*.t, L A . * , wherein on p a g e 3,
p a r a g r a p h 6 Mt

Barker, again under oath stated:

"My First a p p e a r a n c e on behalf of H a r l i n e in
general b a n k r u p t c y p r o c e e d i n g s was on about
December 31, 1 9 8 6 . "
M r . Barker was paid by Dr. H a r l i n e for
general bankruptcy m a t t e r s for work done by M r . Barker from
Nov en tbei 1 0

] 98 6 through November 31 , 1986. R

61

Ex., N o . " A " ,

A f f i d a v i t of C o t r o - M a n e s ) , R 163, A f f i d a v i t , H a r l i n e , par 6
and b i l l i n g s and cancelled check appended t h e r e t o .
W h y t e , w h i l e an employee of M r . Barker in his

deposition testified that he did not represent Dr. Harline in his
personal bankruptcy. R. 360.
19.

Mrs. Betty Marsh, testified that Mr.

Barker

had been contacted to represent Dr. Harline as early as late
October, or early November, 1986.

R. 357 (Depo., Marsh, pp. 13,

14, 19).
At page 13 of her deposition Mrs. Marsh stated that
in late October, mid to late October, she was acting as attorney
for Dr. Harline.
On page 14 she stated that she had possibly
had two brief conversations with Mr. Barker.
She testified:
"A. (Mrs. Marsh) I think that I had one brief telephone
call—again, I am not positive of this--I think I had
one brief telephone call with Mr. Barker, long distance,
he was in Salt Lake city, and I think we discussed this
rather briefly, but it was somewhere between when Dr.
Harline and/or Jerry Wight had advised me that he would
be present at the hearing and then of course the day of
this hearing we talked about--I don't remember exactly-he was there for the hearing because of the fact that
he was replacing both me and the Vlahos Firm."
R. 357 (Depo., Marsh, p. 14), see
also R 242, Ex "A", p 14.
20.

Dr. Harline testified that he believes his

contacts with Mr.
November, 1986.

Barker was as early as late October or early

R. 162, Affidavit, Harline, p. 1; R. 242, Exhibit

"B"; Depo., Harline p. 4 & 5 ) .
(10)

21

Mr. Larry Whyte was the employee of Mr. Barker and

under the supervision of Mi. Barker.

R. 359-360 (Depo., Whyte, p.

13).
22,
nc

Defendants both testified that they did not have

• s e e n Dt , Ha t 1 i n *f :•» Bditki up* K $ Schedules, H:. Barker,

the employer of Mr. Whyte, not at all ami Kr. Whyte as late as
summer oi f a U of 1987.
Hi

Hri k i testified:

"Q, (Mr. Cotro-Manes): 1 believe you testified you
had not seen the bankruptcy schedules in thi s matter?
A.

(Mr. Barker) that's my best recollection."
R. 3 61

z o . nr. Ba r k e r t es t i f i ed t ha t I: ie h a d i ic t seen
Dr. Harline's Bankruptcy statement of affairs prior to the
commencement of this suit nor had he requested any of his employees
tc obtain copies.
Mi: Barker testified:
"Q. (Mr. Cotro-Manes): I show you what has been
marked for the purposes of this deposition as
plaintiff's Exhibit 17, which appears to be. . .
statement of affairs for debtor not engaged in
business on the second page.... It is your testimony
that you've never seen these documents before.
A. (Mr. Barker) As near as I can recall, I've not
seen them prior to this litigation.
Q. Did you ever request Mr. Whyte for or on
your behalf to obtain copies of the bankruptcy

(11)

schedules of Dr. Harline?
A.

Not that I recall
R. 362 (Depo., Barker, p. 104).

Mr. Whyte testified:
"Q. (Mr. Cotro-Manes) I show you what has been marked
as Plaintiff's Exhibit 17, which appears to be the
various documents which respect to the statement of
affairs, bankruptcy filings, schedules and whatever,
and ask you if you can tell me within a time frame,
like fall, winter, spring, whenever it was that you
first saw this document.
A.

I'd say summer or fall of 1987."
R. 362 (Depo., Whyte, p. 31).

24.

Defendants both testified that they had not looked

at the docket sheet on Dr. Harline's Bankruptcy, Mr. Barker the
employer of Mr. Whyte, not at all and Mr. Whyte

not until

the

summer of 1988.
Mr. Barker testified in his deposition:
"Q. (Mr. Cotro-Manes in referring to Exhibit 19):
Have you ever seen this docket sheet before
or copies of it or the original on file with the
clerk's office?
A. (Mr. Barker):

Don't believe so.

Q. Did you ever ask anyone from your office to obtain
a copy of the docket of the matters filed in the
Harline Bankruptcy?
A.

Not that I recall.

Q. Did you specifically ever ask Mr. Larry Whyte
to ever obtain a copy of it?

(12)

Nof *>*»*- T reca, .

A,

R. 362 (Depo,, Barker, F. +.*'<)
1 11 . W h y t H

t e 5i 1.1 f i eri :

"Q. (Mr. Cotro-Manes) Did you ever see the docket sheet
on Dr. Harline's bankruptcy?
A,

I donf t know

Mr. Kayi
'ever1 as in this litigation or excluding
this litigation?
Mr. Cotro-Manes:

At any time.

Q. (bj Mr. Cotro-Manes)

At any time?

A. I don't specifically recall having seen the docket
sheet prior this litigation
I just don't recall seeing
it."
fn*?*
25

whyte, p. 138, 139)

Defendants both testified that they had not seen the

order of Court directing the filing of amp"idp'i schedules. R. 242,
Ex. " 0 " , p. 2 (Barker Affidavit) ; b

U 'i d>pij i( Barker,

57);

(Whyte Affidavit).
2 6.

r

-l T e m e n t s f o :i M :i : B a r k e r t :> : :>i i ie i i :i a.s

attorney for Dr. Harline were originally arranged for through the
law firm representing Dr. Harline1s professional corporation and
who had previ

27

resent ed h

i s persona 1 bai iki: u p t cy .

Mr, Barker, admits that he became attorney of record

for Dr. Harline, at least in some capacity, by December
R . 3 ''• 7
(13)

31, 1986,

28.

Mr. Barker never discussed with prior counsel,

Mrs. Marsh matters pertaining to the bankruptcy proceeding. He
testified:
"Q. (Mr. Cotro-Manes) I believe you've already
testified you had no conferences with Mrs. Marsh
relative to Dr. Harline's bankruptcy or bankruptcy
matters?
A. (Mr. Barker) At the bankruptcy court.
only thing I can recall."

That's the

Q. Did you ever request of Mrs. Marsh to send you any
documents or records or papers with respect to Dr.
Harline or Dr. Harline's Bankruptcy matters.
A.

I don't recall doing so."
R. 363 (Depo., Barker, p. 135)

29.

Mr. Barker did not request or obtain any copies of

any 2004 examinations of Dr. Harline, nor did he make inquiry of
Dr. Harline that such examinations had been taken. R. 364

(Depo.,

Mr. Barker, pp. 139-140)
Mr. Whyte testified:
"Q.

Do you recall ever requesting or obtaining copies

of any other 2004 examination of Dr. Harline?
A.

You said requesting or obtaining?

Q.

Yes.

I can break it down into two questions if

you want.
A. No. I don't recall ever requesting, and I don't
know if I've ever obtained or seen or had a copy of
another 2004 Examination."
R. 364 (Depo., Whyte, p. 48)
(14)

30.

Mr. Whyte knew of a 2004 examination of Dr. Harline

which took place in September, 1986, but made no effort to obtain
a copy of the transcript or to ascertain what had been brought out
in the examination.
31.

R. 364

(Depo., Whyte. pp. 48 and 49).

Dr. Harline paid fees, both to Mr. Barker and to Mr.

Whyte, in amounts of $24,0000 and $112,000 respectively.
R. 372.
32. Dr. Harline served interrogatories upon the defendants,
to which, in part, defendants asserted objections, which ran to the
disclosure of witnesses who they may or would call at the time of
trial, on the grounds that the interrogatory sought information
protected by the attorney-client privilege and attorney work
product doctrine. They objected to describe or identify exhibits on
the same grounds. They further objected to revealing whether they
ever prepared amendments to Dr. Harline's bankruptcy, reviewed his
schedules or statement of affairs; the number of bankruptcy
proceedings each had represented clients in or the names of clients
they represented clients in bankruptcy matters on the grounds of
relevancy.
R. 213 through 226, (Motion to Compel, Ex.
"A") .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Where there are genuine issues of fact unresolved
(15)

the granting of a summary judgment is error.

As the relationship

between Dr. Harline and Mr. Barker and Mr. Whyte, the extent of
that relationship, the date that such a relationship occurred and
what the conduct of the defendants was and whether damages resulted
therefrom remains in question, the trial court erred in granting
the defendants a summary judgment.
2.

Pre-trial discovery should not be by ambush or by

trickery and it is error of a trial court to deny a party the
ability to conduct meaningful pre-trial discovery.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT CAN ONLY BE GRANTED
WHERE THERE ARE NO MATERIAL FACTS
IN CONTROVERSY
The question of whether there was an attorney-client
relationship, and when that relationship arose, was a material
fact that remains unresolved in this matter.
Plaintiff claims that there was such a relationship.
Defendants deny this relationship.
This is a crucial and material fact 'that would preclude any summary
judgment.

If this is the only contested material fact, it is

sufficient to deny a summary judgment, as only one contested fact
is necessary to deny a summary judgment.
542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975).
(16)

Holbrook Co. v. Adams,

The question of the existence of an attorney-client
relationship is a question of fact for determination by the
trier of fact after a trial is held on the merits of the case.
George v. Caton, 93 N.M. 370, 600 P.2d 822 (1979), and no formal
contract is necessary to create a relationship of attorney and
client, George, supra (citing cases from nine other jurisdictions,
p. 827 of the Pacific citation).
In George, a Navaho family allegedly contracted with
a law firm to represent them in a wrongful death action.
action was not timely filed.

The

The attorney's (two) testified that

no attorney-client relationship had ever existed.

A motion for

summary judgment was granted the attorneys based upon their
testimony.

The appellate court reversed the summary judgment and

held that it was a question of fact as to whether or not an
attorney-client relationship was created. This is exactly the same
situation that the case at bar poses. Mr. Barker and Mr. Whyte say
that no relationship, as to the bankruptcy, ever arose.

Dr.

Harline says to the contrary.
Whether the relationship'of attorney-client exists
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Grievance
Com., Wyo, State Bar v. Riner, 765 P.2d 925 (Wyo. 1988); Carlson v.
Langdon, 751 P.2d 344 (Wyo. 1988). Attorney-Client relationships
may be implied. Margulies by Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195
(17)

(Utah 1985); citing E.F. Hutton, 305 F. Supp. 387; Alexander v.
Russo, 571 P. 2d 350 (Kansas App. 1977)

No fee need be paid, Smith

v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 440 P.2d 65 (Cal. 1968);
Alexander, supra.; Matter of the Discretionary Proceeding Against
Gary G. McGlothen, 99 Wash. 2d 515, 663 P.2d 1330 (1983),
although under the facts of this case, fees of over $112,000 were
paid to Whyte and over $24,000.00 were paid to Barker.
In the present matter, the record shows that defendants
clearly, by their sworn statements, undertook to represent Dr.
Harline in his bankruptcy matter.

However, in spite of these sworn

statements, they deny such an undertaking. This is a contested
question of fact, which alone is sufficient to reverse the trial
court's granting of a summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
However, there were more than one contested fact, they, the
attorneys, claimed that even if there was an attorney-client
relationship, still, the attorneys were not retained to file
amended statements or schedules or to do anything with respect to
the bankruptcy; further, they failed to look to the bankruptcy
schedules to ascertain their adequacy and completeness. Also, they
failed to speak with his former attorney, Betty Marsh to ascertain
the current status of the bankruptcy matter.
They failed to look at the court files to ascertain any
outstanding order or the status of the pending bankruptcy.
(18)

They failed to move for an extension of time to file
such amendments in conformity with the Order of Court.
They knew or should have known that schedules could be
amended at anytime during the pendency of a bankruptcy matter,
irrespective of their failure to move for an extension of time,
this is not even discretionary with the Court to deny. Tignor v.
Parkinson, 729 F.2d 977 (1984); In Re Doan, 672 F. 2d 831 (1982);
In Re Greshenbaum, 598 F.2d 779 (1979).
All of the above assertions by Dr. Harline are denied
by Mr. Barker and Mr. Whyte.
Bankruptcy Rule 1009 states:
" (a) General Right to Amend. A voluntary
petition, list, schedule, statement of
affairs, . . . may be amended by the debtor
as a matter of course at any time before the
case is closed."
The law is clear that an attorney owes a duty of making
a reasonable investigation of the facts of a case that he has
undertaken to represent a client with respect thereto. Hansen v.
Wightman, 538 P.2d 1238, (Wash. App. 1975). Further, he has a
duty to his client to use knowledge, skill and ability, ordinarily
possessed and exercised by members of the legal profession
similarly situated. 7 Am Jur 2d 249, Attorneys at Law, Sect 199.
It is submitted that any attorney, under any circumstances, would
look at a file to ascertain the status of a matter, and what in his
(19)

opinion should be done with respect thereto.

In a bankruptcy

matter it is submitted that the looking of the Statement of Affairs
and the Schedules would be the minimal that any competent attorney
would look to.

It is further, submitted that previous 2004

proceedings, which are depositions in the bankruptcy arena, should
be looked to.

As previous counsel had been involved, it is

submitted that a competent attorney would also contact that or
those attorneys to ascertain what had transpired and their
thoughts, impressions and ideas.
What an attorney should do, is a question of fact for the
determination of the trier of fact. Jackson vs. Dabney, 645 P.2d
613 (Utah 1982) and while the facts of this case clearly
demonstrate acts of malpractice on the part of the defendants, it
is admitted that it is not up to the Court to weigh the
creditability of the testimony on amotion for summary judgment, it
must determine if their are disputed issues of material fact.
Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978); Hill v. Grand Central
Inc., 25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150 (1970); W. M. Barnes Co. v.
Sohio National Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981).
Utah law commands that an attorney represent the
interests of his client with competence and diligence, and that
there is an implied covenant to do so.

Dunn v. Kckay, Burton,

McMurray and Thurman, 584 P.2d 894 (Utah 1978).
(20)

Utah law, and the cases decided thereunder, are clear
that Summary Judgment should be granted only when it is clear from
the undisputed facts that the opposing party cannot prevail. Lack
v. Deseret Bank, 746 P.2d 802 (Utah App. 1987); P.A.A.D. v.
Graystone Pines Homeowners, 789 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 1990).
It is not necessary for the plaintiff on a motion for
summary judgment to prove his legal theories, it is only necessary
for him, the non-moving party, to show "facts" which controvert
those facts alleged by the defendants. Salt Lake City Corp. v.
James Construction, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah App. 1988).

While it

is true that the defendants contend that Dr. Harline in signing the
bankruptcy papers and that this is what caused his harm but it is
submitted that this is a matter of contributory negligence, and it
is
submitted that this issue can only be determined by the trier or
fact.

Hansen v. Wightman, 538 P.2d 1238 (Wash. App. 1975).

If not contributory negligence, then, perhaps, an independent
intervening cause to the injuries to the plaintiff, which would
preclude recovery by the plaintiff.

However, the existence of an

independent intervening cause, is an issue for determination by the
trier of fact, and not one of law. Collins on behalf of Collins v.
Perrine, 778 P.2d 912 (N.M. App. 1989).
Mr. Barker and Mr. Whyte attempt to assert that it is
necessary for Dr. Harline to prove that the attorney-client
(21)

relationship was entered into in October or November, 1986.
is wrong.

This

When ever the attorney-client relationship occurred, if

the attorney commits an act of malpractice, he is liable for any
damages, whether nominal or otherwise, which may have resulted from
his acts or failures to act.

If that relationship occurred

remains a disputed fact in this case.
POINT TWO
DAMAGES, ARE ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
BY THE TRIER OF FACTS
The amount of damages is an issue for determination by a
trier of fact, and nominal damages may be awarded in a legal
malpractice action, Annotation, 45 ALR2d 96, Sect. 5; Dicta in
Dunn v. Mckay, Burton, McMurray and Thurman, 584 P.2d 894 (Utah
1978), even if no greater damages are established.

Mere

speculation or conjecture cannot be the basis for a judgment, but
if there is evidence from which an inference may be reasonably
drawn, it would be error to remove that determination from the
trier of fact. Lindsay v. Gibbons and Reed, 27 Utah 2d 419, 479
P.2d 28 (1972).
POINT THREE
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
REQUIRE A DISCLOSURE OF ALL
WITNESSES AND EXHIBITS
Rule 26(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in
pertinent part states:
(22)

"Parties may obtain discovery . . .and the identity
and location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter."
One of the purposes of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
is to eliminate the elements of surprise and trickery, Ellis v.
Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P.2d 39 (1987). As stated in the case
of State Road Commission v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 381, 412 P.2d 914
(1966):
"The idea of making a lawsuit a game of
tricks by keeping information secret to
surprise the opposition at a critical moment
is more suited to the fictionalized drama of
stories and plays than to actual trials in a
court of justice.
The Court went on and observed:
"We see no impropriety in requiring the plaintiff
to state the names and addresses of its witnesses."
POINT FOUR
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
REQUIRE A PARTY TO REVEAL ALL
MATTERS THAT COULD LEAD TO
DISCOVERY OF ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
Mr. Barker and Mr. Whyte objected to the answering of
interrogatories of Dr. Harline, in part, on the basis that the
interrogatories were not relevant.
Those interrogatories ran from when Mr. Barker and Mr.
Whyte commenced to represent Dr. Harline though their past
experience in dealing with bankruptcy matters in their practice of
law.

Ellis v. Gilbert, supra. It is submitted that the
(23)

interrogatories were in fact relevant and the trial court did not
make any effort to examine Dr. Harline's motion, as clearly, upon
reading the interrogatories and the objections thereto, or if it
did look at the interrogatories and the answers, it erred in
applying common sense. It is inescapable but what the
interrogatories were proper and would have lead not only to
discoverable evidence but also to answers to critical issues
involved in this malpractice action.

It is conceded that the

actions of the trial court with respect to discovery matters are
generally up to the trial court, Utah v. Petty, supra, but this is
not without limit.

Also, discovery is to be liberally permitted.

Utah v. Petty, supra.; Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 245 P.2d 224.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred
in granting summary judgment in this matter where there remained
genuine issues of fact unresolved.
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred
in denying Dr. Harline's motion to overrule objections to
interrogatories and to deny his motion to compel answers to
interrogatories.
The summary judgment should be set aside and the matter
remanded back to the trial court for trial on the merits.

(24)

The Trial Court's denial of Dr. Harline's motion to
overrule the objections should be overturned and an order
entered overruling defendant's objections, further, the court
should enter its order to compel the defendants to answer the
interrogatories heretofore propounded by the plaintiff.

(25)

ADDENDUM
1.

Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Proc

DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY.
Rule 26. General provisions governing discovery.
(a) Discovery methods. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of
the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes;
physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission.
(b) Discovery scope and limits. Unless otherwise limited by order of the
court in accordance with these rules, the scope of discovery is as follows:
(1) In general. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party
seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location
of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground
for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial
if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in
Subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i) the
discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or
less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or
(hi) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the
parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or
pursuant to a motion under Subdivision (c).

(26)

2 . R u l e 5 6 , Utah R u l e s of C i v i l

Procedure

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories,
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.

(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
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